Objective The goal of the present paper is to provide evidence on the behavior of physician practice cost functions. Data sources Our study is based on the data of 3686 physician practices in Germany for the years 2006 to 2008. Study design We apply a translog functional form and include a comprehensive set of variables that have not been previously used in this context. A system of four equations using three-stage least squares is estimated. Principal findings We find that a higher degree of specialization leads to a decrease in costs, whereas quality certification increases costs. Costs of group practices are higher than of solo practices. The latter finding can be explained by the existence of indivisibilities of expensive technical equipment. Smaller practices do not reach the critical mass to invest in certain technologies, which leads to differences in the type of health care services provided by different practice types. Conclusions This is the first study to use physician practices as the unit of observation and to consider the endogenous character of physician input. Our results suggest that identifying factors that influence physician practice costs is important for providing evidence-based physician payment systems and to enable decision-makers to set incentives effectively.
Introduction
For inpatient care, many prospective payment systems in developed countries rely on information from studies on hospital cost functions [1] . There is a large body of literature on hospital cost functions and productivity that began in the 1960s. Recent studies in this sector have focused on specific aspects, such as the influence of research activity on hospital costs and the length of stay [2, 3] . Additionally, countries increasingly maintain their own hospital cost panels to facilitate the country-specific design of prospective payment systems [4] . However, relatively little is known about the behavior of physician practice costs and productivity. Physician payment systems are seldom based on information from physician cost functions. Payment rates are often based on very small cost samples or are simply driven by political considerations. The danger of this approach is that it may lead to unintended incentives of physician payment rates. Thus, understanding the behavior of physician practice costs is important, both for providing evidence-based physician payment systems and for enabling decision-makers to set incentives in the intended manner.
Studies on physician practice cost functions are scarce, and there are several problems and challenges regarding data and methodology involved in the empirical estimation of physician practice cost functions. First, as compared to the hospital sector, much less data on physician practices are available, leading to estimations based on small samples, estimations based on the physician instead of the practice as unit of observation, and/or specifications that miss important variables [5] . Second, physician practices & Jonas Schreyögg jonas.schreyoegg@wiso.uni-hamburg.de produce outputs using various input factors, including the time input of the self-employed owner of the practice. As there is no exogenous measure for the opportunity costs of self-employed physicians, previous studies [6] regress only outputs, non-physician input prices, and a fixed amount of the owner's time input as a proxy for his opportunity costs on non-physician costs (i.e., all costs except the costs of the time of the self-employed physician). Escarce and Pauly [5] point out that the inclusion of physician time as a fixed input in the cost function is problematic, as the time input is the result of a utility maximization of the physician and therefore needs to be treated as an endogenous variable. This methodological issue has only been addressed by two studies [5, 7] . The goal of the present paper is to provide evidence on the behavior of physician practice cost functions. In doing so, we aim to detect the influence of managerial variables such as the organizational form of the practice and the degree of specialization on physician practice costs. Finally, we aim to estimate economies of physician practice. To do so, we propose to estimate a physician practice cost function that addresses the challenges related to the estimation of physician practice cost functions by (1) using physician practices as the unit of observation and (2) considering the endogenous character of physician input building on the model proposed by Escarce and Pauly [5] . Thus, we estimate a system of four equations using threestage least squares (3) using a longitudinal dataset and (4) employing a number of variables commonly used for hospital cost-function estimations that have not yet been studied in the outpatient context (e.g., the degree of practice specialization).
The paper is structured as follows. The second section presents a review of previous literature and identifies research gaps. The third section presents the data that we use. The fourth section elaborates on our model and estimation strategy. The fifth section presents and discusses our findings, and the final section draws a range of conclusions.
Previous research
According to methodological characteristics, empirical studies dealing with productivity and costs of physician practices can be grouped into three major categories: (1) ad hoc, (2) neoclassical, and (3) behavioral. The first specification lacks a sound economic theory and aims to explain (empirically) the variance of a dependent variable (e.g., costs per unit of output) with a set of all variables that are supposed to influence the dependent variable [8, 9] . Studies of this category focus on a wide range of different subjects. Hence, Frech and Ginsburg [10] and Marder and Zuckerman [11] performed a survivor analysis to detect the most efficient practice size. They examined changes over time in the relative number of practices of different types (e.g., solo vs. group practices, or single-specialty vs. multispecialty practices), concluding that practice types that are represented more often over time have a higher level of efficiency. Other studies of this category focus on different aspects, as the empirical explanation of the level of physicians labor supply [12] [13] [14] or the investigation of factors influencing physician practice income [15] .
The second approach exploits the duality between the production function and a (minimum) cost function [16] . It requires the imposition of regularity conditions such as linear homogeneity in input prices [17] and estimates output as a result of inputs/costs as a result of outputs and input prices [8, 9] . Regarding production studies, the study by Reinhardt [18] is the seminal work in this field. The main objective of Reinhardt's paper was the investigation of influence factors (e.g., auxiliary personnel and the organizational form of the practice) on the physician's amount of output. A range of later studies apply the production function proposed by Reinhardt [18] to analyze the influence of various factors on the productivity of physicians [19] . Thurston and Libby [20] revisited Reinhardt's [18] study and estimated a generalized linear production function proposed by Diewert [21] , which allowed the estimation of q-complementarities of different types of inputs (e.g., physician and non-physician labor input or capital). Moreover, there are also studies using the neoclassical approach that estimate cost functions. For instance, Pope and Burge [6] estimate marginal costs of physician services using a quadratic physician cost function that satisfies all the regularity conditions proposed by Varian [17] .
Studies of the third approach start from neoclassical assumptions, but relax some of the requirements in order to accommodate specific aspects of the production process and/or specific market conditions. Gaynor and Pauly [22] estimate a ''behavioral production function'', assuming that physicians choose the amount of effort that maximizes their utility. Later studies estimating physician production functions [23, 24] build on the theoretical framework of Gaynor and Pauly [22] . The assumption of a utility-maximization process of physicians is also taken into account in physician cost studies [5, 7] . As previous physician cost studies [6] , the two latter studies include physician time as proxy for the opportunity costs of the self-employed owner of a practice in their cost functions. However, the studies of Escarce and Pauly [5] and Gunning and Sickles [7] differ from previous studies in an important way: Escarce and Pauly [5] were the first to take into account the problem of the endogenous character of physician labor input in the estimation of physician cost functions. The authors showed that under the assumption that physicians (i.e., practice owners) maximize their utility depending on net income and leisure, physician labor input is endogenous, and conventional measures of marginal costs and economies of scale are problematic. They proposed a framework for a more precise estimation of physician cost functions and illustrated their model based on the American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Socioeconomic Monitoring Survey (SMS). Escarce and Pauly [5] stated that the results of their study should not be the basis for policy implications, as the usefulness of the SMS for the estimation of physician practice cost functions is limited for a number of reasons. For instance, it is based on a telephone survey and focuses on the individual physician as the unit of observation, although a given practice may have several physicians, and there may be substitution effects between the owner and other employed physicians of the same practice. In a more recent study, Gunning and Sickles [7] re-estimated the results based on an update of the SMS for 1998.
In the present study, we estimate a physician practice cost function and take the endogeneity of physician labor input into account, building on the model proposed by Escarce and Pauly [5] . Our analysis is based on a large dataset of physician practices for the years 2006-2008. Thus, we incorporate the level of the physician practice and its characteristics in the analysis while also controlling for some physician characteristics in our instrumental variable regressions. We estimate separate models for general practitioners and specialists, as there is reason to believe that cost functions vary systematically between them. Moreover, we include measures to control for case mix and specialization, which we expect to improve the consistency of the estimates. Finally, we employ additional covariates at the practice level that are commonly used in hospital cost functions to improve the efficiency of the estimations.
Data
The data for our study were obtained from the survey of practice costs and the medical care structure of the Research Institute of the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians of Germany. The Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians represents all physicians in Germany with an authorization to treat patients with statutory health insurance, who constitute about 85 % of the German population. The institute's survey contains detailed information on inputs (i.e., physician labor input, subdivided into different categories as working hours inside and outside the practice; full-time equivalents of different types of staff; area of the practice and the technical equipment), on outputs (i.e., the quarterly number of cases treated for all patients with statutory health insurance and the share of statutory health insured patients treated) and on revenues and costs of different cost categories (e.g., staff costs, rental charges, laboratory costs, depreciation, or insurance fees), each of which is measured at the practice level. In addition, the survey contains detailed information on practice characteristics, including the year of founding of the practice, the organizational form of the practice, participation in disease management programs, or quality certification. It also contains physician characteristics for the owners of the practice for the years 2006 through 2008.
To obtain the data, the Research Institute sent questionnaires to 30,000 physician practices and ensured that the relative number of questionnaires sent to physicians in specific regions and of specific specialties corresponded to the respective relative number of physicians in specific regions and of specific specialties. Among the regions and specialties, practices were chosen randomly. In 2010, practices were asked to provide information for 2006 through 2008. Moreover, the data were validated by a statecertified tax advisor for most practices (93.8 % of all provided data). In total, 4664 questionnaires for the entire study period (out of the 30,000 that were sent out) were returned to the institute. However, not all practices completed the questionnaire for all years, as in some instances the practices were founded in 2007 or 2008. After plausibility checks were conducted, an average of 4339 physician practices remained in the sample.
As the responses of many practices were incomplete, we performed a missing values imputation for some variables. All values are presumed to be missing at random (MAR). We account for the missing values by using multiple imputation, as single imputation leads to an underestimation of the variance of the subsequent estimates based on the imputed sample [25] . Similar to other studies, we performed five imputations [26, 27] . We chose to use the Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) [28] as the method of imputation. However, as recommended by Blough et al. [29] , we also checked the robustness of our imputation method by different types of missing value imputation; we performed different versions of multiple imputations (with five and 20 imputations) and also performed a single imputation for all variables with missing values to produce an even larger sample. The final dataset consists of responses from an average of 3686 physician practices for 2006-2008 (unbalanced panel) of 33 different specialties and two comprehensive practice types (i.e., physicians working in practices that include different types of specialties). The number of practices between the original and the final sample is different because we only imputed those variables with the highest rate of missing values. Thus, we lost some practices because of missing values.
In order to detect any biases resulting from the low response rate or the large number of missing values, we compared our study population to the total population of physician practices by using information from our study population and from a register of all outpatient physicians in Germany. Regarding important characteristics such as the share of solo/group practices or the distribution of practices among different specialties, there were only small differences between our study population and the total population. In conclusion, despite the moderately low response rate, the sample used in this study is an appropriate representation of the range of physician practices in Germany. To increase the comparability of the physician practices in our sample, we divide the entire sample into the following two subcategories: general practitioners and specialists. A further division into smaller subcategories did not increase the precision of the estimation. Thus, we decided to only divide the sample of specialists into further subsamples for the purpose of sensitivity analysis. Table 1 shows a summary of the variables used in our study:
Methodology Model specification
Physicians are presumed to be utility-maximizing ownermanagers who use labor and capital inputs as well as their own time input to produce outputs (i.e., physician services), given market constraints and a certain production relationship [18, 20] . A common problem in the estimation of physician practice cost functions is the lack of an accurate measure of the opportunity costs of the self-employed owner of the practice. Hence, the opportunity costs cannot be included in the costs of the physician practice, and no input price for the owner's time input can be calculated, but the time input is supposed to influence costs as well as the amount of the remaining inputs. To deal with this problem, we follow previous studies estimating physician cost functions and include the owner's labor input as a proxy for his opportunity costs in our cost function. Hence, we regress costs (excluding the owner's opportunity costs) on outputs, input prices, and the quasi-fixed time input of the self- employed owner (i.e., our cost function is reminiscent to a short-run (variable) cost function). As the owner's time input is the result of a utility-maximization process of the owner, who maximizes his utility from income and leisure, it is most appropriately treated as endogenous. We take this issue into account and estimate the following cost function:
The dependent variable C it is cost of the physician practice i at time t (i.e., all costs except the opportunity costs of the physician) and also includes estimations for rental charges if the physician owned the practice. All other variables are part of the independent variables of the cost function: The output variable Y it is the number of cases treated for patients with statutory health insurance. The input prices for labor (PL it, ), i.e., for all practice staff except of the practice owner(s), office space (PO it ), and of the remaining capital input (PC it ) were not part of the dataset, and they had to be calculated. The price of labor was created by the division of all expenses for labor by the total number of full-time equivalents of all staff categories [except the owner(s)]. The calculation of different prices for subgroups of staff was not possible, as labor costs for subgroups of staff were not part of our dataset. In calculating the price of office space, rental charges or estimated rental charges (if the physician owned the practice) and associated costs (e.g., expenditures for heating) were divided by the area of the practice in square meters. The price for capital input was created by dividing all remaining costs (i.e., all costs except staff costs and rental charges) by the number of physicians per practice (i.e., the sum of owners and the FTEs of employed physicians). The variable T* represents the utility-maximizing labor input of the self-employed owner of the practice as a proxy for his opportunity costs. Other proxies for opportunity costs, such as the hourly wage of salaried physicians in the respective market area, are problematic for a number of reasons. For instance, salaried physicians and self-employed physicians may differ in unobserved characteristics, leading to differences in their opportunity costs. Moreover, the tasks and the risk associated with the different types of employment (i.e., employed or self-employed) differ, which might again lead to differences in opportunity costs of employed and selfemployed physicians [5] .
In order to control for differences in practice characteristics and to identify factor influencing practice costs, we included organizational and environmental variables (Z it ) that were assumed to influence costs: One key variable of interest is the formal organization of the practice (i.e., solo vs. group practice). This variable does not represent the actual size of the practice, as production and cost functions already contain the number of cases treated by each practice, which is the determining variable for the size (or volume) of the practice. As previous studies [22] suggest that organizational form might be endogenous, we performed a DurbinWu-Hausman test and found the organizational form to be exogenous. Moreover, as there were only very few medical treatment centers, we dropped these observations from our sample and compare solo to group practices only. A second variable of interest is the degree of specialization of the practice, which is defined as the degree to which a practice focuses on certain services or procedures. To determine the degree of specialization, we used the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI), which is the sum of the squared proportions of all different services or procedures executed by the practice of all services or procedures executed. Regarding the inpatient sector, previous studies used the HHI as a measure of the degree of specialization [30, 31] . Moreover, we added a dummy variable for participation in nationwide uniformly defined disease management programs [32] and a dummy variable for participation in gatekeeper programs. Gatekeeper programs offer bonuses to patients if they restrict themselves to always attending a general practitioner (GP) before they may be referred to specialists, which is not mandatory in Germany. Dummy variables for the existence of quality certification and the number of days of professional development for each owner are added as proxies for higher structural quality that a practice provides.
As only patients insured by statutory health insurance could be included as output variables, we control for the share of patients with statutory health insurance treated by each practice. Other control variables are the geographic location [i.e., urban areas (cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants), urbanized areas (more than 150 inhabitants per square kilometer) or rural areas (less than 150 inhabitants per square kilometer)]. We used this variable as a proxy for differences in patient behavior. For instance, in urbanized areas, patients tend to visit practices more frequently. Also, physician visits require a longer time as urbanized areas in Germany have more migrants and patients with low socio-economic status. Moreover, we included the specialty of the physician practice.
Finally, we included a case-mix index variable to control for differences in case severity developed by the Research Institute of the German Federal Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians. In Germany, the outpatient reimbursement system is a mixture of flat-fee and fee-for-service components for technical services. All services provided are associated with a certain number of points depending on the costs related to the respective service. To calculate the case-mix index, the number of reimbursed points as a proxy for the resource use of each physician practice was predicted by applying a regression based on the diagnoses recorded in the respective practice. Please note that we used reimbursement points as a proxy for resource use, as this is the best proxy available for all practices in Germany (not only the practices included in our cost function). Thus, the case mix index was calculated for all practices in Germany. In doing so, all 80 diagnoses from the system of morbidity-based risk adjustment that is used for the allocation of funds between Germany's statutory health insurers were considered. To create the case-mix index variable (CMXI), the predicted resource use of each practice was divided by the predicted resource use of all practices of the same specialty:
where a i is the predicted influence of diagnosis i on resource use based on a regression analysis with resource use as the dependent variable, x ijs is the number of cases treated with diagnosis i in practice j of specialty s and n is the number of practices of specialty s.
To test for multicollinearity between our independent variables, we calculated variance inflation factors (VIF) and found the VIF of the environmental and organizational variables to be about 1, indicating that there were no problems of multicollinearity.
The descriptive statistics of all variables included in our cost function (except for the dummy variables for different specialties) are shown in Table 2 .
Functional form and estimation strategy
Griffin et al. [33] provide a detailed overview of the characteristics of different production functions and propose to choose functional forms according to the hypotheses implied by a certain function (i.e., the maintained hypotheses should be acceptable/useful), according to the possibility and ease of statistical estimation and application and/or according to the goodness-of-fit of the functional form. We applied the criteria and excluded functions that impose undesirable hypothesis (e.g., functional forms that allow the output to be positive while all input factors are zero). As our dataset is large, the criterion of possibility and ease of estimation was of lower importance in our case, i.e., we can also choose functions with a large number of interaction terms. Finally, we estimated different functional forms and compared their goodness-of-fit:
We specified our cost function as a translog functional form, which was introduced by Christensen et al. [34] . The translog functional form and variations of this function have been applied in hospital-cost studies [35] [36] [37] and in physician-cost studies [5] . A disadvantage of this functional form is its inability to deal with observations that contain zero levels for any output included in the cost function [38] . However, this is not of relevance in our case, as we estimate a single-output cost function with no zero values for output. As an alternative, we also estimated the less flexible Cobb-Douglas function. However, according to the results of the likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis that the Cobb-Douglas function should be used instead of the translog function was rejected at the 1 % level. Moreover, we specified our cost function as the Leontief function, which was proposed by Diewert [21] and applied to hospitals by Li and Rosenman [39] and to physician practices by Gunning and Sickles [7] . However, because of the skewed distribution of the dependent variable, the translog functional form is more appropriate for our dataset (i.e., Leontief function did not fit well). Linear homogeneity in input prices is generated by imposing constraints on the sum of certain coefficients prior to the estimation, and symmetry is achieved by construction. 1 As proposed by Escarce and Pauly [5] , we jointly estimate a cost function and an equation of physician labor input. The cost function is:
where C it is physician practice costs for practice i at time t, p k,it is the price for input, k,y it is the number of cases treated for all patients with statutory health insurance, T j,it is physician time of physician j, Z k,it are our variables of interest and a set of further control variables, u t is a year fixed effect and e it is the error term of the practice. The equation for physician labor input is:
where Tj, it , p k,i,t, y it ,Z k,it , u t and e it are the same variables as in our cost function. The variables included in X k,it are the instrumental variables of our estimation. We choose years of experience and a dummy variable for the interaction of being female and being between ages 35 and 44 as a proxy for having young children. Both of these variables are expected to influence physician time and to not be correlated with costs for several reasons: years of experience should influence physician time as more experienced physicians have different preferences when maximizing their utility of leisure time and income compared to less experienced colleagues. This 'saturation' is supported by the decrease of physician time input as the physician becomes more experienced [5, 7] . At the same time, experience should have no influence on costs. This is intuitive, given that exogenous factors such as salaries of non-medical staff or rent for office space in the area should be unaffected by the physician's experience on an individual level. Additionally practices are often not managed by the owner of the practice (i.e., small practices are commonly managed by other practice staff and larger practices tend to employ a practice manager). Regarding women age 35-44, we assume that having children influences the time input of young female physicians in particular, again due to differences in the utility of leisure time and income. The Federal Medical Association of Germany reports that the share of physicians aged 35 or below has been declining for years due to the strenuous education process. Students typically finish their medical exam around the age of 28 and required certificates for general practice or specialists take further 4-8 years. Thus, there are only very few female physicians below the age of 35 in outpatient practice. Most importantly, according to the Federal Medical Association, young female physicians are particularly affected by having children due to insufficient 1 Linear homogeneity in input prices and symmetry were achieved by the following restrictions:a kl ¼ a lk ; P 2 k¼1 a k ¼ 1; P 2 l¼1 a kl ¼ 0; P 2 k¼1 c k ¼ 0 for all k; l; Please note that we also estimated the model using input normalization instead of defining restrictions. However, the model with restrictions fitted our data much better.
Estimation of a physician practice cost function 487 capabilities to accommodate their time constraints (e.g., opportunities for part-time practice or sufficient childcare for full-time practice) [40] . Therefore it is plausible to assume that women in this age group will be the most affected by having children, which in turn influences their preferences regarding work and leisure time. In conclusion, there is no reason to believe that this variable could influence costs. In order to take advantage of the flexible Translog function, we included interaction terms for office space, labor and capital input in the cost/production functions. The interactions show the partial elasticities of substitutions between the different inputs.
We estimate the physician cost function and labor equation in a system of four equations, including factor demand functions of employed staff and office space, to improve the efficiency of the estimates. The four equations (for the cost function, labor input equation, office space, and employed staff) are estimated using three-stage least squares (3SLS). To account for correlation within physician practices, the regression is conducted using a sandwich variance estimate [41] . As shown by Hardin [42] , this estimator is also robust for two-stage models.
To calculate economies of scale, we proceeded as follows:
where S is the maximal rate of increase in the practice's output as all inputs (including the time of the owner) increase proportionally. A value of S greater than unity implies that a proportional increase in all inputs leads to a larger than proportional increase in outputs. 2 To obtain measures for marginal costs, we derived our cost function with regard to the output variable and multiplied the result by the quotient of C it and Y it .
To check the robustness of our results, we ran the regressions based on the different imputations performed as well as based on the data set without imputation.
Results and discussion
Results of our three-stage least squares regression analyses for general practitioners and specialists are presented in Tables 3 and 4 . To confirm the strength of our instruments, we performed the Kleibergen-Paap test for weak instruments for both subgroups [43, 44] . The F-statistics of 20.19 for general practitioners and 12.96 for specialists suggest that the hypothesis of weak instruments was rejected for both subgroups and that relative IV bias, according to the thresholds provided by Stock and Yogo [45] , is unlikely to be a major problem in our estimation. Moreover, the Hansen/Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions found that these restrictions could not be rejected for both samples [46] . Marginal costs are estimated to be about 9.87 € for general and 12.06 € specialists. Economies of scale for both subgroups are greater than unity. For general practitioners, the value for S is 4.31, which indicates that a 10 % increase in output leads to a 2.32 % increase in cost. For specialists, the value is 6.81, which indicates that a 10 % increase in output leads to a 1.47 % increase in cost. Thus, general practitioners and specialists could reduce their cost per case substantially if they increased the number of cases treated.
The coefficient for the organizational form of the practice, that compares to costs of group practices to those of solo practices was positive and highly significant (p B 0.01) for general practitioners (0.556) and specialists (0.557), which indicates that costs of group practices are 55.6 % higher than those of solo practices for general practitioners and 55.7 % higher for specialists. We encountered at least three different reasons for the differences in the costs of practices of solo and group practices. First, the costs of group practices may be higher because of indivisibilities of certain assets. To invest in indivisible technical equipment, practices need to reach a critical mass of (a) capital and (b) cases treated, as indivisibilities are associated with scale effects [47, 48] . Indeed, as mentioned above, we find scale effects for general practitioners and specialists. Therefore, solo practices may not invest in the respective technology. Our data support this hypothesis. Although physicians share a large part of fixed costs in group practices, costs per owner of cost categories that are related to the technical equipment of the practice (e.g., depreciation and rental charges or leasing fees for technical equipment) are significantly higher in group practices for general practitioners and specialists.
To determine whether our results would change if we considered the intensity of technological services used in practices, we estimated further regressions for specialists and general practitioners. As mentioned, in Germany, the outpatient reimbursement system is a mixture of flat-fee and fee-for-service components for technical services. All services provided are associated with a certain number of points depending on the costs related to the respective service. The total number of all points generated by each practice was used as an alternative output variable, as this variable should control for differences in costs per case treated that are caused by differences in technologies. However, this change had no effect on our result. All relevant coefficients remained robust.
Second, higher costs of group practices may be explained by lower incentives of the practice owners to (a) treat a high number of cases, i.e., by free-rider problems in larger practices with several physicians, as proposed by DeFelice and Bradford [23] , and (b) control costs, as proposed by Newhouse [49] . For general practitioners, the number of cases treated per owner is significantly lower in group practices, whereas there is Estimation of a physician practice cost function 489 no significant difference for specialists. Regarding the incentive to control costs, our data do not confirm this hypothesis. Input factors that are unrelated to the type and complexity of cases treated (e.g., the square meter of the practice or the full-time equivalents per owner) are not higher or even lower in group practices. Third, the incentive to treat more patients and to control costs may be lower for employed physicians than for owners and there might be differences in the share of employed physicians (i.e., the ratio of FTEs of employed physicians to the total number of physicians, including owners) between group and solo practices. To control for this effect, we perform further regressions and include the share of employed physicians as a variable in our cost function. This variable is negative and insignificant for general practitioners and positive (0.2139) and highly significant (p B 0.01) for specialists, but the remaining results are unaffected by these changes.
The coefficient of the degree of specialization is negative and highly significant (p B 0.01) for general practitioners (-0.861) and negative and insignificant for specialists, which indicates that an increase of specialization by 1 % reduces practice costs of general practitioners by 0.86 %. Physicians who focus on specific services or procedures may be more efficient in providing these services and therefore may treat the same number of patients with lower resource input, thus leading to lower costs. The results of two hospital efficiency studies point in a similar direction. Both studies found specialization (although measured by different indices) to be positively associated with efficiency [50, 51] .
The coefficients for quality certification and for the number of days of professional development are both positive and significant/highly significant (p B 0.05/ p B 0.01) for general practitioners and specialists. Thus, quality certification increases costs of general practitioners by 7.5 % and costs of specialists by 2.6 %, whereas one further day of professional development increases costs by 0.8 % for general practitioners and specialists. Both variables may be indicators of a focus on structural quality of the practice. Prior studies investigating the association between quality and costs in the healthcare sector reported conflicting results [52] [53] [54] [55] . However, all of these studies are based on the hospital sector. To date, there is no other study examining the association between quality indicators and costs for physician practices.
Regarding other, non-managerial variables that were also included in the cost function our findings show that the physician time had a negative impact on costs. This suggests that the more a self-employed physician works per year, the lower the costs associated with his practice. This is consistent given that other inputs (such as rent) would stay the same while the physician works more and subsequently generated more treated cases. For capital input the findings suggest that higher capital input per physician leads to lower overall costs, suggesting that physicians who invest more into equipment and infrastructure of their practice can treat cases at lower costs.
We investigate the robustness of our findings in several ways as mentioned previously. First, we compared 3SLS results to a simple OLS regression to investigate whether our approach improves over OLS (Table 5) . OLS shows comparable results to 3SLS, the variance for some coefficients is slightly increased, as is usually the case for 3SLS. One major benefit of the 3SLS approach is the change in coefficient for physician time input, which is negative for 3SLS, as one would expect given that dC/dt \ 0. Physicians can reduce their non-physician input costs by substituting more of their own labor [5] . This also suggests that due the reduced endogeneity after 3SLS the coefficient is much closer to the 'true' b for the influence of this variable. We also estimated 2SLS obtaining similar results, but 3SLS results had the best fit. Consequently the 3SLS results are preferable over OLS and 2SLS. Second, in the instrumental variables literature, authors frequently argue that results for variables of interest should remain stable for different IV specifications to show that any correlation does not affect the results [56] . To prove that any correlation due to the inclusion of certain IV variables does not affect the results, we have rotated our instrumental variables and compared different 3SLS results. We find that coefficients and standard errors remain consistent and robust for different specifications. Third, as recommended by Blough et al. [29] , we account for missing values by different types of missing value imputation and re-ran all regressions based on the different imputations performed as well as based on the data set without imputation. The coefficients have the same direction throughout the different versions and the standard deviation changes only slightly. Moreover, as mentioned previously, we divide the sample of specialists into further subsamples and estimate separate cost functions for these subsamples to investigate whether our findings deviate among different specialties (e.g., for anesthesiologists, dermatologists, gynecologists and surgeons). For the majority of specialties, coefficients have the same direction and significance, but the calculated economies of scale of some specialties differ from the economies of scale of the total sample of specialists. Due to the smaller sample size of the single specialties, these results are less robust than the results for the total sample. Additionally, we estimate the cost function with and without restrictions to determine whether our main findings depend on the restrictions imposed. Without restrictions, coefficients for the number of cases treated (i.e., the output variable) and for input prices differ slightly, whereas the coefficients of other covariates are not affected by these changes. As a further robustness check, we also investigate several interaction effects among different variables in our regressions (e.g., the degree of specialization, the practice's size and quality certification), but the coefficients are insignificant for general practitioners and specialists and does not increase the efficiency of the estimation. Finally, we have also checked the robustness of the 3SLS estimates using different sets of control variables. These results are overall less robust than our preferred specification, but they show that the findings are robust in regard to key variables of interest such as organizational form of the practice or degree of specialization.
Our study also has several important limitations. First, data from a large number of practices were incomplete. However, even without missing value imputation, our dataset is still quite extensive relative to previous datasets in this field. Moreover, we performed a multiple missing value imputation to take this problem into account. Second, only cases of patients with statutory health insurance are included in our output variable. We would have preferred 
Conclusions
The main problem in the estimation of physician practice cost functions is the lack of a price for the time of selfemployed practice owners, i.e., of the owners' opportunity costs. The inclusion of the owners' time, which is the most appropriate proxy variable to measure opportunity costs, leads to endogeneity problems and to biased estimates. In this study, we estimated a physician practice cost function based on panel data and took the endogeneity of the owners' time input into account. The results of this analysis can provide useful information for the development of a more appropriate physician payment system. Our study generally allows important insights into the costing behavior of physician practices, which may facilitate the development of regular cost panels for reimbursement purposes. So far, payment systems for outpatient care are typically based on politically determined fees. In contrast, hospital payment systems in many countries are based on actual costs from cost panels consisting of hospitals, which typically provide standardized yearly cost information on a voluntary basis [4] . This study shows that it is feasible to calculate average costs, marginal costs, and other information needed to develop payment systems based on actual costs.
More specifically, the study shows that costs per case are higher in group practices than in solo practices, whereas we detect substantial economies of scale for general practitioners and specialists, which indicates that physician practices could reduce their costs per case if they increased the number of cases treated. It is likely that this finding results from the existence of indivisibilities of certain expensive technical equipment, which leads to step costs. We found that group practices invest more in technological equipment and thus produce higher costs per case relative to smaller practices. However, several further approaches may be used to explain our finding, especially varying incentives in solo/group practices. The finding that cost behavior differs systematically between solo and group practices may suggest that payment systems should take into consideration that group practices tend to have higher investment requirements than solo practices. Thus, payment systems may have to allow higher profits for group practices. Other results such as the cost-reducing effect of specialization in the context of GP practices can also be an important implication for decision-makers, as payment incentives to increase specialization may serve as an important strategy to reduce costs.
The impact of the organizational form of physician practices on costs and potential explanations for the respective findings should be addressed by future research papers. More studies in different countries with different and possibly improved data sets are necessary to generate robust evidence. Moreover, implications of the organizational form and other variables on the quality of care, which were not focused on in this study, should be investigated in future studies.
